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EVIDENCE-SALES OF SIMILAR LAND AS EVIDENCE
OF VALUE IN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS
The desirability of admitting sales of similar land as
evidence of value of property taken by condemnation is gener-
ally conceded.' There can be no question but that this is the
proper view. It is the task of the jury to ascertain from the
evidence presented the true market value of the land condemned,
the market value being the acceptable price in legal currency as
between one who desires to purchase and one who desires to sell
without personal or legal compulsion having any effect on either
party. The market value of certain land is created and guided
by the sales of similar realty in that vicinity. What then could
be a better indication of the general selling price than evidence
of the value received in the sale of similar lands?
In spite of this reasoning, there is some authority contra .2
The view expressed by the latter decisions is that the market
value is that price which would be received at a well conducted
sale which was brought to the notice of all potential purchasers.
Therefore, individual sales would be of little or no value. The
proponents of this view point out that it would be difficult to
bring out the circumstances of each sale and that each sale de-
pends upon the urgency, necessity and peculiar desires of both
the seller and the buyer. They also feel that admission of such
evidence would introduce collateral issues into the trial. From
a practical standpoint, adherence to the latter view would seem
to exclude all but opinions of experts as evidence of value.
Market value follows the trend of all sales of similar land; and
even though peculiar circumstances enter into each sale, the true
market value is determined by these sales. The better view
seems to be that particular sales of similar lands should be
placed before the jury as evidence of value. However, it may be
shown that the sale was made under extraordinary conditions,
thereby lessening its probative value. 3
IDady v. Condit, 209 Ill. 488, 70 N. E. 1088 (1904); Music v. Big
Sandy and K. R. R. Co., 163 Ky. 628, 174 S. W. 44 (1915).
'Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Stanwood, 71 Neb. 150, 98 N. W. 656
(1904); Becker v. Philadelphia and R. T. T. Co., 177 Pa. 252, 35 Atl.
617 (1896).
3 Hankel v. Wabash Pittsburg Terminal R. R. Co., 213 Pa. 485,
62 Atl. 1085 (1906).
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Offers to sell are not admissible. 4 It is readily seen that
such offers are speculative and their admission would introduce
collateral issues. However, it has been held that bona fide offers
to buy are admissible. 5 It would seem that the latter would be
subject to the same objections as the former.
The question of whether or not sales of similar lands to a
party having the power of eminent domain are admissible as
evidence of value is well settled. The overwhelming weight of
authority denies admission of such sales.0 If sales to a party
having the power of eminent domain are to be admitted at all, it
should first be affirmatively shown by the party seeking admis-
sion that the sale was not conducted under threat of condem-
nation proceedings. It has been held that an award by a jury in
condemnation proceedings against similar property is admissible
as evidence of value.7 This seems proper since a finding by a
jury is the market value of that particular land; and if the lands
are similar, it should be admitted.
Before a sale of land is admissible as evidence of value, the
party submitting must show that the land sold is reasonably
similar to that condemned so as to have sufficient probative value
for admission.8 For purposes of discussion, the similarity re-
quired may be divided into three classes: (1) the characteristics
of the lands must be reasonably similar, (2) the location of the
lands must be sufficiently near in distance and (3) the sales must
be similar in point of time.
4Sherlock v. Chicago, B. and I. R. R. Co., 130 Ill. 403, 22 N. E.
844 (1889); Yellowstone Park R. R. Co. v. Bridger Coal Co., 34 Mont.
545, 87 Pac. 963 (1906).
Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Roskemmer, 264 Ill. 103, 105 N. E.
695 (1914); contra, Brock v. Harlan County, 297 Ky. 113, 179 S. W.
(2d) 202 (1944).
'City of San Luis Obispo v. Brizzolara, 100 Cal. 434, 34 Pac. 1083
(1893); Peoria Gaslight and Coke Co. v. Peoria Terminal Ry. Co.,
146 Ill. 372, 34 N. E. 550 (1893); Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Co. v.
Hays, 238 Ky. 189, 278 S. W. 17 (1931); LEwis, THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1888) Sec. 447; contra, Langdon v. City of New York, 133
N. Y. 628, 31 N. E. 98 (1892).
'Louisiana Ry. and Navigation Co. v. Moreree, 116 La. 997, 41
So. 236 (1906); contra, City of Chicago v. Lehmann, 263 Ill. 468, 103
N. E. 829 (1914); Howe v. Howard, 158 Mass. 278, 33 N. E. 528 (1893).
' St. Louis 0. H. and C. Ry. Co. v. Fowler, 142 Mo. 673, 44 S. W.
771 (1898) (lack of similarity in physical characteristics); Teele v.
City of Boston, 165 Mass. 88, 42 N. E. 506 (1896) (lack of similarity of
location); Commonwealth v. Combs, 229 Ky. 627, 17 S. W. (2d) 748
(1929) (lack of proximity in point of time).
STUDENT NOTES
The characteristics of land whose sale is to be introduced
must be reasonably similar to those of the land whose value is in
question. The value of improved residence lots on an improved
street cannot be introduced as evidence of the value of unim-
proved land,9 nor can the sale of non-platted lots in the same
vicinity be introduced as evidence of the value of platted lots.1
However, characteristics may be sufficiently similar even though
there is a variation in size," in improvements thereon, 12 or in re-
strictions on the lots. 13 If the physical characteristics as a whole
are reasonably similar, the evidence should be admitted
It is well settled that the land whose sale is to be introduced
must not be so distant as to be of no assistance in the determina-
tion of the market value of the condemned land. The market
value varies with the locality so that the sale price of land in one
locality does not necessarily indicate the market value of land
somewhat distant. It has been held proper to exclude the sale of
land on a different street,' 4 but in Gardner v. IRhabitants of
Brookljie'5 a sale of a cranberry farm was admitted as evidence
of the value of another such farm situated several miles away. It
is obvious from the above examples that no dcfinite standard
can be fixed. However, it can be said that the rule as to prox-
imity necessarily varies with the nature of the land. The more
unusual the quality or the use of the land, the greater the dis-
tance at which the sale price of similar lands should be al-
lowed. As distance increases, the force of the evidence de-
creases and a wide discretion is allowed the trial judge in draw-
ing the line at which evidence having no practical value shall
be admitted.'0
Just as it is necessary to have similarity of characteristics
and proximity of location, it is also necessary that the sale to
be introduced was sufficiently close in time to the condemna-
'St. Louis 0. H. and C. Ry. v. Fowler, 142 Mo. 670, 44 S. W. 771(1898).
"' Martin v. Chicago and M. Electric Ry., 220 Ill. 97, 77 N. E. 86
(1906).
" Pierce v. City of Boston, 164 Mass. 92, 41 N. E. 227 (1895).
" Pierce v. City of Boston, 164 Mass. 92, 41 N. E. 227 (1895).
Lyman v. City of Boston, 164 Mass. 99, 41 N. E. 127 (1895)
" Teele v. City of Boston, 165 Mass. 88, 42 N. E. 506 (1896).
127 Mass. 358, 363 (1879).
" Packard v. Bergen Neck Ry., 54 N. J. Law (25 Vroom) 443, 25
Atl. 506 (1892).
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tion so as to be of probative value.' 7  Market value fluctuates
over a period of years, or even months, and a prior or sub-
sequent sale may be of little or no assistance in determining
the market value of land at the time it was condemned. No
clear line can be drawn from the cases and the results vary with
the circumstances. The only reasonable rule which may be ap-
plied is that remoteness in time is a valid objection only where
conditions have changed to such a degree as to make the sale
an unreliable test of value.' 8
The necessary conclusion to the above discussion is that
sales of similar lands in the ordinary course of business, and
awards by juries in condemnation proceedings against similar
lands should be admissible. Offers to buy or sell similar lands
are not admissible. Sales to one having the power to condemn
should not be admitted unless it is affirmatively shown that the
sales were not made under threat of condemnation proceedings.
Even in instances where it would be admissible otherwise, the
relation between the lands must be such that the general phy-
sical characteristics are reasonably similar, the location of the
land sold must be sufficiently close to the land condemned so as
to indicate the market value of the latter, and the time of the
sale and condemnation must be sufficiently close so that the
sale will not lose its probative quality due to a change of
market value. Similarity in characteristics, location and time
must be affirmatively shown by the party seeking admission of
the evidence.
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' Everett v. Union Pacific R. R., 59 Iowa 243, 13 N. W. 109
(1882); Commonwealth v. Combs, 229 Ky. 627, 17 S. W. (2d) 748
(1929).
"Louisiana Railway and Navigation Co. v. Morere, 116 La. 997,
41 So. 236 (1906).
